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INTRODUCTION 
On the first Tuesday of the month, a few dozen people stand staggered 
on the steps of the county courthouse.  They appear to be reading aloud to 
themselves from a sheaf of papers.  Passersby steal glances but often are 
unaware that these readings carry great legal significance: foreclosure auc-
tions of homes.  Those representing the mortgagees have neither podium 
nor microphone, let alone a gavel.  Murmuring simultaneously, they don’t 
take turns.  As the law requires, these auctions likely have been advertised 
in small print in newspapers.  But, for a variety of reasons, interested third-
party bidders with the requisite cash, cashier’s check, or wiring instructions 
are few and far between.  Absent a higher third-party bidder, the mortgagee 
becomes the owner of the home in a matter of minutes.  Absent a later chal-
lenge, the process is over.1 
 
∗ George R. Ward Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  This es-
say is based in part on a paper presented at Moving Forward in Addressing Credit Market 
Challenges: A National Symposium held at Harvard Business School in February 2010.  
Thanks to Eric Belsky, Anna Gelpern, Mark Weidemaier, and participants at that sympo-
sium and the Cooper-Walsh Colloquium at Fordham University School of Law for com-
ments.  Thanks as well to Rachel Lerner and Mika Chance for research and editorial assis-
tance at various stages. 
 1. This description is loosely based on my direct observation of “Foreclosure Tuesday” 
on the steps of the Fulton County Courthouse in Georgia, which is a non-judicial foreclosure 
state. 
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Just a few city blocks away, people with distressed mortgages file bank-
ruptcy petitions in a federal courthouse.  These filings will usually stop a 
scheduled foreclosure auction of their houses, at least temporarily.  Many 
of these homeowners will propose repayment plans that will cure their 
mortgage arrears, although completion of those plans is far from certain. 
These observations illustrate how bankruptcy and foreclosure systems 
address very similar legal and economic issues.  But, as a formal matter, 
they are entirely distinct.  Different judges, different lawyers, different 
rules.  The division of debtor-creditor law among multiple legal systems 
has many perfectly reasonable explanations.  Yet, the consequences for the 
delivery of consumer protection are too often overlooked and not yet well 
understood. 
This Cooper-Walsh Colloquium contribution reviews the legal infra-
structure of tools that protect debtors’ assets or income, or that enable deb-
tors to resolve secured credit problems during ordinary times (e.g., not spe-
cific crisis interventions).  Part I divides consumer protection tools into 
functional categories: protection of assets and future income, and retention 
of property subject to a security interest in default.  Part II identifies the lo-
cation of similar tools in federal law, uniform state law, and non-uniform 
state law.  Part III examines implications of this divided system, with a 
special focus on the bundling of debtor protections and the role of interme-
diaries.  This discussion helps us imagine improvements to consumer pro-
tection whether or not new legal tools are added. 
I.  FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES OF EX POST DEBTOR PROTECTION 
 In the traditional law school model, the concept of a remedy is equated 
with an action for money or injunctive relief in a lawsuit.  Indeed, many 
federal and state statutes or common law doctrines offer these forms of re-
lief to consumer debtors.2  Damages might be compensatory, punitive, 
and/or include attorneys’ fees for a prevailing debtor.3  For example, sec-
tion 9-625 of the Uniform Commercial Code (part of Article 9 governing 
secured transactions in personal property) explicitly authorizes damages to 
a defaulting debtor if a secured creditor fails to comply with Article 9’s re-
 
 2. Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protec-
tion Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 663 (2008); Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to 
Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305 (2010); William C. Whit-
ford, Structuring Consumer Protection to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1018, 
1026-41 [hereinafter Whitford, Structuring Consumer Protection]. 
 3. Whitford, Structuring Consumer Protection, supra note 2, at 1029-32; see also 11 
U.S.C. § 523(d) (2006) (shifting fees to creditors in non-dischargeability actions in bank-
ruptcy under some circumstances). 
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quirements, such as conducting a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale, 
providing reasonable notice of the sale, and not breaching the peace during 
any self-help repossession of collateral.4 
Scholars and advocates have long recognized a variety of impediments 
to consumers’ effective use of traditional litigation-based remedies.  Many 
consumers with viable claims do not seek advice on pursuing such claims 
either offensively or defensively.5  Or, if they do, they wait too long for 
such actions to be any use.  People with viable claims may have trouble ob-
taining legal representation when the dollar value of the remedy is modest.6  
This is a problem even if a law authorizes treble damages, fee-shifting, or 
other mechanisms to magnify the value of the litigation to lawyers.7  Al-
though Congress and state legislatures contemplated that litigants with 
small claims could join forces and bring their claims collectively,8 obtain-
ing certification of a consumer class action remains difficult.9  And, in 
 
 4. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-625(a) (2010) (“If it is established that a secured party is not pro-
ceeding in accordance with [Article 9], a court may order or restrain collection, enforce-
ment, or disposition of collateral on appropriate terms and conditions.”); id. § 9-625(b) 
(“Subject to [certain] subsections . . . a person is liable for damages in the amount of any 
loss caused by a failure to comply with this article.  Loss caused by a failure to comply may 
include loss resulting from the debtor’s inability to obtain, or increased costs of, alternative 
financing.”); id. § 9-625(c) (providing enhanced statutory damages in consumer goods 
transactions).  A damages or injunctive remedy in the Article 9 regime substitutes for inva-
lidation of a foreclosure sale that state real property law permits.  However, such invalida-
tion may rarely occur due to costs and barriers to foreclosure defendants of actively engag-
ing in litigation. 
 5. E.g., Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing 
the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists 
Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13, 83. 
 6. Id. at 85. 
 7. See Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 69, 78-79 (2007). See generally Harold L. Levine, A Day in the Life of a Residential 
Mortgage Defendant, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 687 (2003); Whitford, Structuring Consumer 
Protection, supra note 2; William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Con-
sumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bank-
ruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397 (1994) [hereinafter Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized 
Justice]. 
 8. Budnitz, supra note 2, at 664. 
 9. Weidemaier, supra note 7, at 79-80 (“[C]lass certification is far from common. 
Class actions run counter to a strong individualist streak in American law, which demands 
respect for the individual litigant’s right to control his or her own claim, and which, by and 
large, requires individualized proof of facts unique to each claimant.  Because of the need 
for such proof, class actions seeking damages may generally be certified only where, among 
other things, common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only 
individual class members. This balancing act leads courts to deny certification to many pro-
posed consumer classes.”). See generally Gilles, supra note 2. 
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some contexts, doctrines such as the holder in due course limit the ability to 
pursue a damage remedy or to present a related defense to nonpayment.10 
Debtor-creditor law includes other kinds of tools for defaulting debtors, 
however, based on a somewhat different model (although sometimes still 
premised on litigation).  Categories of these tools are explored below. 
Protection of unencumbered assets and future income: A variety of laws 
in this category prevent creditors from satisfying even undisputed claims 
out of particular assets or future income of individual debtors.  Examples 
include limits or bans on deficiency judgments in foreclosure actions,11 
limits or bans on garnishment of wages, and exemptions of property inter-
ests from judgment lien enforcement.  Bankruptcy law essentially 
represents a combination of these tools with other types relating to secured 
credit.12 
Retention of property encumbered by a security interest: The prior cate-
gory, protection of unencumbered assets and future income, has only li-
mited direct effect on consensual secured creditors, at least as measured on 
an ex post basis. So, for example, property exemptions do not bar consen-
sual secured creditors from reaching the full value of an asset.  Tools to re-
tain property that secures a debt by contract are of considerable interest to 
many consumer debtors, but also to policymakers concerned about the 
broader impact of the loss of homeownership.  Consider this menu of pos-
sibilities: 
(1) Property redemption from a secured loan—A baseline protection of 
all foreclosure law is to permit debtors in default to redeem collateral 
prior to a foreclosure sale.  This principle applies both to real and 
 
 10. As McCoy and Renuart have explained, this doctrine “shields securitized trusts from 
most claims and defenses to nonpayment that the borrower has against the lender based on 
unconscionability, breach of contract, and most types of fraud.” Patricia A. McCoy & Eliza-
beth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional Mortgages 37 (Har-
vard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper UCC08-5, 2008), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/understanding_consumer_credit/papers/uc
c08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf.  McCoy and Renuart go on to explain how one qualifies for pro-
tection under this doctrine: “First, it must meet the definition of a ‘holder’ of a negotiable 
note.  In addition, the trust must have taken the note: (2) for value; (3) in good faith; and (4) 
without notice that the note contained certain defects.” Id. at 37-38. 
 11. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-623 (2002) (providing pre-disposition redemption right for personal 
property); U.C.C. § 9-626 (2002) (describing circumstances under which personal property 
security deficiency judgments can be limited in non-consumer transactions, and leaving de-
ficiency judgment limitation for consumer transactions to the courts); Melissa B. Jacoby, 
Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Sub-Prime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2272 (2008) (discussing real property). 
 12. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2006). 
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personal property.13  Various laws set the price of redemption diffe-
rently, with most state laws requiring payment of the full debt plus 
the creditor’s costs, but with bankruptcy law permitting redemption 
of personal property based on the value of the collateral.14  Less un-
iformly available is a post-sale redemption of real property (which is 
not recognized for personal property under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code). 
(2) De-accelerate, cure, and reinstate mortgages and security interests— 
Some laws permit borrowers with defaulted mortgages to retain their 
homes by curing arrears and paying associated costs in a lump sum 
even if the mortgage holder already had properly accelerated the loan 
in accordance with the terms of the agreement.15  In bankruptcy law’s 
version of this reinstatement right, a debtor can pay those arrearages 
over time.16 
(3) Modification of a secured loan—Bankruptcy law permits debtors to 
restructure some (but not all) kinds of secured debts over the secured 
party’s objections.17  This potentially includes reducing secured debt 
to the collateral’s value, paying that value with interest over time (es-
sentially an installment redemption), and treating the remainder as an 
unsecured claim payable pro rata with other unsecured claims.  As a 
foreclosure management effort, members of Congress have proposed 
to expand the circumstances under which at least high-risk mortgages 
could be modified in Chapter 13.18 
(4) “Avoidance” of mortgages or security interests—Property retention 
is also occasionally accomplished through legal avoidance of a secu-
rity interest.  For example, a trustee in a bankruptcy case steps into 
the shoes of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser and may seek to strip 
a mortgage from real property if a bona fide purchaser would have 
had rights superior to the mortgagee.19  This power is used to police 
compliance with state law formalities for “perfecting” security inter-
 
 13. See U.C.C. § 9-623 (providing pre-disposition redemption right for personal proper-
ty); Jacoby, supra note 11 (discussing real property). 
 14. 11 U.S.C. § 722. 
 15. See Jacoby, supra note 11.  For a study of the use of this right in Cook County, Illi-
nois, see Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and 
Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639 
(1997). 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5). 
 17. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5). 
 18. Emergency Homeownership and Equity Protection Act, H.R. 225, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 200, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). 
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ests and mortgages that maximize creditor protection.20  Alternative-
ly, a trustee may seek to avoid a mortgage as a preferential transfer of 
an interest in the debtor’s property.21  Notably, the exercise of avoid-
ance rights by a trustee depends on significant lender mistakes or 
omissions.  Neither needs of the debtor nor motives of the creditor 
tend to be relevant to the formal legal analysis. 
II.  CHANNELS OF PRODUCTION OF EX POST DEBTOR PROTECTION 
The debtor protections and tools discussed in Part I are generated 
through federal law, uniform state law, and non-uniform state law.  Con-
sumer bankruptcy law is a prominent example of federal law.  Its discharge 
of debt, which effectively protects assets and future income, is used as a 
remedy for a wide variety of debtor-creditor problems.22  It also contains 
many of the tools for working with secured debt discussed in Part I.  Sepa-
rately, federal law sets a floor on the proportion of wages that may be gar-
nished.23  Occasionally, federal regulation promulgated pursuant to a sta-
tute produces these kinds of debtor protections.  For example, the Federal 
Trade Commission long ago promulgated a rule that deems non-purchase-
money, non-possessory liens on household goods, to be an unfair credit 
practice.24  The new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s rulemak-
ing and enforcement authority could affect ex post debtor protections as 
well.25 
The uniform law process produces a significant portion of commercial 
law, including some relevant to this discussion.  A uniform act is a model 
statute intended to harmonize the law of multiple jurisdictions.  It aims for 
enactment by all state legislatures.  The Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) is a joint product of the American Law Institute (ALI) (a private 
organization of several thousand lawyers, judges, and academics) and uni-
 
 20. See, e.g., In re Cocanougher, 378 B.R. 518 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (upholding avoid-
ance of mortgage now owned by CitiFinancial under Kentucky law); In re Biggs, 377 F.3d 
515 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding avoidance of deed of trust due to defective acknowledgment 
under Tennessee law). 
 21. 11 U.S.C. § 547; Wells Fargo Mortg. v. Lindquist, 592 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding avoidance of mortgage as preferential transfer when it was not recorded at the 
time of the bankruptcy filing).  For more details, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Mortgage 
Problems Through the Lens of Bankruptcy, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 171, 179 (2009). 
 22. Susan D. Kovac, Judgment-Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675, 
679 (1991); Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 7, at 401. 
 23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (2006). 
 24. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2011). 
 25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 1011-18 (2010). 
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form law commissioners from each state.26  Article 9 of the U.C.C., origi-
nally drafted in the 1950s, governs security interests in personal property in 
both household and business contexts.  After a decade-long reform effort, 
all states and the District of Columbia enacted a substantially revised ver-
sion of Article 9 and made it effective in 2001.27  Part 6 of Article 9 go-
verns the remedies a creditor may exercise against a debtor and collateral 
upon the debtor’s default as determined by contract interpretation.28  But it 
also protects debtors in the process and makes most debtor protections non-
waivable in advance of default.29  Restatements of law, also a product of 
the ALI, are sometimes used to promote uniformity through state court 
adoption of particular legal principles relevant to debtor protection.30 
The third category is non-uniform state law.  Real estate foreclosure re-
mains an important example.  Some real property experts have sought 
greater uniformity in foreclosure law through the uniform state law move-
ment, restatement projects, or federalization of foreclosure law.31  Because 
these efforts have been unsuccessful, state law continues to supply most of 
the baseline rights for debtors who have defaulted on their real property 
mortgages.32 
Non-uniform state law also establishes exemptions that shield individual 
debtors’ property from court judgment enforcement by creditors.  The in-
terstate variation is notable: some state laws exempt unlimited value for 
 
 26. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, 
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 583 (1998). 
 27. Some experts originally sought federalization of the law of security interests of per-
sonal property rather than uniform (or non-uniform) state law. Amelia H. Boss, The Future 
of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an Increasingly International World, 68 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 349, 352-55 (2007).  A technical revisions project for Article 9 is currently under-
way. U.C.C. Article 9 Review Committee, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction 
=projects.proj_ip&projectid=21 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 28. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-601 (2003) (setting forth menu of creditor options upon debtor de-
fault). 
 29. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-602 (2003) (identifying non-waivable protections for debtors and 
third parties in Part 6); U.C.C. § 9-624 (2003) (governing post-default waivers of sale no-
tice, mandatory disposition, and redemption rights). 
 30. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Non-
judicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1409 (2004) (discussing state court adoption 
of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES).  Other important examples for this 
context include the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT that the ALI is currently considering. 
 31. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 30, at 1408. 
 32. Federal law does preempt state foreclosure law for some mortgage loans held by the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code, 
a federal law, includes features that substantively should count as mortgagor protection. 
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certain categories of property,33 while others protect very little.34  Some 
state legislatures periodically update their laws with respect to both types of 
property and value (perhaps with substantial input or encouragement from 
the relevant bar associations),35 while others retain rather archaic categories 
of property and nominal dollar amounts.  The variations tend not to ration-
ally reflect differentials in economic conditions (let alone differentials 
within the state).36  States also have made diverse decisions about whether 
to provide greater protection of wages from garnishment than the floor es-
tablished by federal law. 
Non-uniformity does offer opportunities for experimentation.  For ex-
ample, since 2004, the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency has of-
fered a loan fund for homeowners who lose their jobs due to changing eco-
nomic conditions.  The program offers zero-interest loans to assist with 
mortgage payments as well as financial assistance while looking for a new 
job or participating in job retraining.37 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Much can be said about the development of consumer debtor protections 
discussed in Parts I and II.  Here, I focus on two sets of questions about that 
development. 
A. Should Debtor Protections be Bundled or Unbundled? 
The legal tools reviewed in Parts I and II implicitly illustrated two mod-
els of ex post consumer debtor protection: bundled and unbundled.  In the 
idealized federal bankruptcy case, a debtor gets future income protection, 
asset protection, and secured debt tools all together.  By contrast, most state 
law tools fill a discrete purpose.  Thus, for example, mortgage reinstate-
ment rights are associated with foreclosure laws, while wage garnishment 
limits exist as a standalone income protection. 
 
 33. Juliet Moringiello, Has Congress Slimmed Down the Hogs? A Look at the BAPCPA 
Approach to Pre-Bankruptcy Planning, 15 WIDENER L.J. 615 (2006) (discussing categories 
like annuities and firearms). 
 34. NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 121 (1997). 
 35. For example, North Carolina and Delaware have recently updated and expanded the 
value of property exemptions for debtors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902 (2010); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 1C-1601 (2009).  In North Carolina, at least, a bar association was involved in the 
effort. 
 36. NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 34. 
 37. Home Protection Program, N.C. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.nchfa.com/Home 
buyers/HOhomeprotectionpilot.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).  Repayment is generally 
deferred for fifteen years.  Completion of an application to participate enjoins the foreclo-
sure process for one hundred twenty days.  Although it started as a pilot program for only 
certain counties, the program later became available state-wide. 
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Prior work has explored some practical problems with bundling in the 
bankruptcy context.38  Put bluntly, the costs may reflect a wider range of 
benefits than is strictly necessary under the circumstances.  A debtor who 
uses bankruptcy to discharge a large foreclosure deficiency judgment is 
paying substantially more to use bundled bankruptcy rights than her coun-
terparts in states that offer protections against deficiency judgments  on a 
standalone basis or broader protection against wage garnishment.39  Some 
might reply that debtors in less protective states reap benefits in terms of 
access to credit, but the extent of this benefit, and the countervailing social 
welfare implications, remain empirically in dispute.40 
Chapter 13 has, perhaps unintentionally, functionally served as a sepa-
rate mortgagor protection law by combining the right to cure and reinstate 
with unrelated burdens and benefits.41  To cure a mortgage in installments 
under bankruptcy law, a debtor must opt for a repayment plan in Chapter 
13.42  Chapter 13 permits a debtor to spread these costs over time, which 
may make them look more manageable than they often turn out to be.  
Some might argue that these higher costs help police against moral hazard, 
but it is far from clear that costs make good screening devices in this con-
text. 
Should some of the bundled features of bankruptcy be offered on a stan-
dalone basis?  In some respects, the financial crisis put these issues on the 
table.  A 2007 task force report from Connecticut explicitly mentioned a 
state law installment reinstatement right as a possibility, albeit without 
much analysis.43  Various foreclosure task forces and consumer advocates 
 
 38. Jacoby, supra note 11, at 2287-88. 
 39. Kovac has argued that some use of bankruptcy comes from insufficient income and 
asset protection through other laws, such as state laws on garnishment.  Although her analy-
sis is not universally embraced, her assessment suggests that bankruptcy usage could be de-
creased by more targeted protection of income from consumer creditors. Kovac, supra note 
22, at 677-78; see also Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of 
Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF. L. 
REV. 177, 250 (1986). 
 40. For a review of literature on this point, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform 
and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 332 n.45. 
 41. See generally id. 
 42. The bankruptcy discharge does not affect in rem rights against collateral.  Thus, 
Chapter 7 debtors who are delinquent on home mortgages or car loans need to make ar-
rangements with lenders or they likely will lose the property.  Debtors can sign binding 
“reaffirmation” agreements to retain personal liability on these debts if lenders so agree. Id. 
 43. CONN. SUB-PRIME MORTG. TASK FORCE, SUB-PRIME MORTGAGE TASK FORCE FINAL 
REPORT (2007).  A search of the relevant legal scholarship, foreclosure task force reports, 
and policy recommendations of advocacy groups in early 2010 revealed no significant sub-
sequent discussions about implementing this proposal or proposals of a similar nature.  An 
update on the work of the Connecticut Sub-Prime Mortgage Task Force as of 2008 did not 
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have more generally recommended the addition of post-acceleration cure 
and reinstatement rights to state law, which some states have adopted in the 
wake of the foreclosure crisis.44  These kinds of proposals could shift some 
debtors away from the aggregated bankruptcy model and deserve closer 
consideration, especially to the extent they could reduce the need for inter-
mediaries,45 who are discussed in greater detail below. 
B. How Does Legal Infrastructure Hinder Effective Use of 
Intermediaries? 
Looking at the legal profession as a whole, very little lawyers’ work is 
directed toward representing families in debt-related disputes.46  The legal 
profession also has incentives to limit competition from non-lawyers,47 and 
the law deters some non-lawyers from assisting consumers on debt prob-
lems.48  Relatedly, it is difficult for lawyers to serve the individualized pur-
 
mention the previous proposal. See CONN. SUB-PRIME MORTG. TASK FORCE, SUB-PRIME 
MORTGAGE TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES UPDATE (2008). 
 44. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(n)(1) (West 2008) (creating a right 
to cure and reinstate up to one business day before the foreclosure sale); MD. HOMEOWNER-
SHIP PRESERVATION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 39 (2007); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
244, § 35(a) (2007) (establishing a ninety day right to cure and bring current upon receipt of 
Notice of Default); MASS. MORTG. SUMMIT WORKING GRPS., REPORT: RECOMMENDED SO-
LUTIONS TO PREVENT FORECLOSURE AND TO ENSURE MASSACHUSETTS CONSUMERS MAIN-
TAIN THE DREAM OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 17 (2007).  Recent proposals also encourage states to 
require mortgage holders to provide homeowners with clear notice of such state law rights 
to cure and reinstate. See JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FOREC-
LOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS DEPRIVE HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC PROTECTIONS 25-29 (2009) 
(asserting the need for meaningful notice to borrowers of state rights to cure and reinstate, 
and describing some related statutes); Dan Immergluck et al., Legislative Responses to the 
Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial States (Working Paper Series, Jan. 28, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1749609. 
 45. Iain Ramsay, Market Imperatives, Professional Discretion and the Role of Interme-
diaries in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Canadian Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399, 459 (2000) (“If it is difficult to find neutral intermediaries 
for the delivery of bankruptcy services then one possible solution is greater simplification 
and routinization and the use of bright line rules which reduces the need for intermedia-
ries.”). 
 46. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 373, 397 (2004) (discussing unmet legal needs of the poor and middle 
class). 
 47. Id. at 405.  For small-claims courts that do not permit consumers to be legally 
represented, see Weidemaier, supra note 7, at 79.  Non-lawyers do play a somewhat greater 
role regarding consumer counseling and preparation for bankruptcy than in other fields of 
law that affect consumers. See generally David A. Lander, A Snapshot of Two Systems That 
Are Trying to Help People in Financial Trouble, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161 (1999). 
 48. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 110 (2006) (imposing heightened requirements on the use of 
non-lawyer petition preparers in consumer bankruptcy cases). 
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suit of consumer debtor remedies at affordable prices.49  Legal representa-
tion of average-sized consumer debt matters is profitable primarily if han-
dled on a volume basis, hence the earlier discussion of class actions.50  
With respect to legal tools that cannot be aggregated formally, such as per-
sonal bankruptcy filings, lawyers find other ways to routinize the process.51  
In this context, some lawyers rely heavily on paralegals for intake work and 
preparation for filing a case.52  This may translate into relatively little in-
depth counseling from the lawyer.53  The volume approach to debtor pro-
tection also may discourage lawyers from affirmatively taking on legal dis-
putes that would help the client, if successful, but would require additional 
preparation and time in court.54 
Specialization aids a volume business.  At least in the consumer law 
world, specialization tends to center on a particular part of the legal system 
even if functionally similar tools lie elsewhere.  In the 1970s, Professor 
Stewart Macaulay set out to study Wisconsin lawyers’ use of the Magnu-
son-Moss Warranty Act, which had been widely touted in the national 
news media as a boon for consumers.  Macaulay quickly discovered, 
though, that “most lawyers in Wisconsin knew next to nothing about the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act—many had never heard of it.”55  The law-
yers who were familiar with consumer protection laws largely knew one 
single state law that addressed debt collection and financing consumer 
 
 49. Sovern, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing economic impediments to lawyers develop-
ing expertise in consumer cases). 
 50. See supra Part I. 
 51. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 7, at 400.  In the context of 
tort “settlement mills,” which also are not formally aggregated, Engstrom writes that 
it is assumed that claims will be straightforward.  Standardized and routinized 
procedures are then designed and employed in keeping with that assumption.  Ef-
ficiency trumps process and quality.  Important tasks (such as client screening 
and, sometimes, actual settlement negotiations) are delegated to non-lawyers.  
Factual investigations are short-circuited or skipped altogether. 
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill-Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1493 
(2009). 
 52. Geraldine Mund, Paralegals: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 2 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 337 (1994).  Observers have reported that consumer bankruptcy lawyers some-
times have filed cases before actually meeting their clients. Id. at 338. 
 53. Id. at 338.  In such a situation, they may first meet at a mandatory post-filing meet-
ing with the case trustee (known as a “341 meeting” after the Bankruptcy Code section that 
requires it). See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). 
 54. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 7, at 406.  Most Chapter 7 
consumer bankruptcy cases involve no court appearances at all. 
 55. Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
115, 118 (1979). 
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transactions.56  Macaulay noted: “[I]f awareness of a more empirically ac-
curate view of legal practice is not developed, reformers are likely to go on 
creating individual rights which have little chance of being vindicated, and, 
as a result, they may fail to achieve their ends repeatedly.”57  Although 
much has changed since the 1970s, Macaulay’s observations have served as 
an important warning.58 
Those who practice debtor-side consumer bankruptcy comprise one of 
the biggest and most developed consumer bars in the country.59  Even be-
fore the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, scholars questioned the 
extent to which lawyers who specialized in bankruptcy were helping their 
clients compare options out of bankruptcy.60  Indeed, scholars  have scruti-
nized how lawyers advise debtors about key decisions even within the 
bankruptcy system, such as whether to file Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.61 
 
 56. Such lawyers nonetheless had a variety of practical techniques for dealing with con-
sumer complaints even though they were not familiar with the relevant formal laws’ details. 
Id. at 118, 130 (discussing practical limits to the development of expertise in various com-
ponents of consumer protection). 
 57. Id. at 161. 
 58. See generally Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many 
Cultures, 6 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501 (1993) [hereinafter Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer 
Bankruptcy]. 
 59. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 7, at 400.  Consumer bank-
ruptcy lawyers tend to be a distinct group from business bankruptcy lawyers. See generally 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Demographics of Bankruptcy Practice, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289 
(1989); Ramsay, supra note 45, at 399 (discussing studies of U.S. lawyers more generally).  
An older study found that bankruptcy lawyers are likely to cluster around the limited loca-
tions of federal bankruptcy courts. LoPucki, supra, at 299 (“Nearly every American lives 
within about 20 miles of a state court of general jurisdiction.  But there is a bankruptcy 
clerk’s office in only 165 American cities.  Bankruptcy judges ride circuit to an additional 
204 cities and towns.  This still leaves many parts of the United States 50 to 100 miles from 
the nearest place where bankruptcy court meets.  Not surprisingly, the offices of bankruptcy 
lawyers are heavily concentrated in the 369 cities where the bankruptcy court meets.”). 
 60. See Kovac, supra note 22; Neustadter, supra note 39, at 233 (finding that even law-
yers who offered more of a client-centered model did not give substantial attention to bank-
ruptcy alternatives). 
 61. Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choic-
es—A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 172-73 
(1997) [hereinafter Braucher, Counseling]; Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, 
supra note 58, at 581-82; Neustadter, supra note 39, at 230, 232 (discussing a “product 
model” of lawyering in which lawyers primarily “sold” a particular kind of bankruptcy). See 
generally Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of 
Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 848, 850 
(1994) (finding subspecialization of consumer bankruptcy lawyers, including some that did 
predominantly Chapter 13 repayment plans).  Iain Ramsay observed a similar phenomenon 
with private “trustees” in Canada. Ramsay, supra note 45, at 422 (quoting a Canadian trus-
tee saying that the trustees are a “destination vendor rather than a mall” and that “[p]eople 
don’t [come] here because they are wandering around”).  For a new empirical analysis find-
ing higher proportions of Chapter 13 cases in districts that permit higher fees, see Frank 
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The internal complexity of each part of the debtor-creditor system cer-
tainly does not help matters.  A prominent example comes from the 2005 
revision to the Bankruptcy Code.62  The amendments changed (and largely 
weakened) bankruptcy law in dozens of convoluted ways and increased the 
cost to debtors of accessing the system.63  Those amendments also estab-
lished financial penalties on lawyers that aimed to make the lawyers think 
twice before recommending Chapter 7 bankruptcy to their clients, and led 
them (along with the extra work required under the new laws) to raise their 
fees.64  The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 2005 
amendments has enhanced the complexity of the amendments’ application 
to individual cases.65  Furthermore, the bankruptcy system has its own ju-
diciary; Congress has authorized over 350 bankruptcy judgeships.66  As 
one would expect (and particularly given an unclear statute), sometimes 
judges within the same district have starkly different views on matters rele-
vant to a consumer bankruptcy case.  Only a handful of such disparities are 
resolved through the appellate process. 
Legal education also bears some responsibility.  With some exceptions 
that rely on a “systems approach” to debtor-creditor law,67 a typical law 
school curriculum tends to follow the channels of law production rather 
than functional categories.  Thus, for example, consumer bankruptcy tends 
to be severed off from “consumer law” courses.68  Even if professors rec-
ognize that this is less than ideal, and even as the content of standard con-
 
McIntyre et al., Lawyers Steer Clients Toward Lucrative Filings: Evidence from Consumer 
Bankruptcy (Working Paper Series, Feb. 10, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708111. 
 62. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 63. Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory Bankrupt-
cy Reform, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 169 (2005). 
 64. Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Costs of Sickness: Exploring the In-
tersections, 71 MO. L. REV. 903, 914 (2006). 
 65. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010) (finding that the projected 
disposable income requirement of Chapter 13 could incorporate forward-looking estimates, 
at least if they are substantial and fairly certain).  
 66. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx (follow “bankruptcy judge-
ships” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).  This includes thirty-six temporary judgeships.  
Otherwise, bankruptcy judges serve fourteen year terms as units of the U.S. District Court 
and receive a salary that is ninety-two percent of a district judge salary. Id.  
 67. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
(6th ed. 2009) (including some bankruptcy law and real estate foreclosure law in a case 
book on Article 9 of the U.C.C.).  
 68. See generally Jeff Sovern, The Content of Consumer Law Classes, 12 J. CONSUMER 
& COM. L. 48 (2008); Jeff Sovern, The Content of Consumer Law Classes II, 14 J. CONSUM-
ER & COM. L. 16 (2010) [hereinafter Sovern, Consumer Law Classes II]. 
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sumer law courses continues to shift,69 the increasing complexity of bank-
ruptcy law deters integration of the subjects. 
When lawmakers add statutory complexity and financial disincentives, 
they decrease the ability of consumer debtors to navigate  the system with-
out representation.  They discourage integration in the law school curricu-
lum.  They deter lawyers who do similar types of activities under a differ-
ent set of laws from branching out.  They increase the barriers to civil legal 
aid lawyers representing clients with debtor-creditor problems.70  With 
fewer lawyers practicing in the area, specialization and fees rise further.  A 
foreclosure defense lawyer in Chicago reports that: 
A competent foreclosure defense lawyer must know the entire Federal sta-
tutory framework [Truth in Lending Act, Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act, Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, Community Reinvestment Act], common law claims and 
defenses, and that lawyer must have the ability to raise and respond to 
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment and other pleadings 
including counterclaims, affirmative defense, as well as know the Rules 
of Evidence and trial procedure.71 
The lawyer’s list illustrates the importance of looking beyond the four 
corners of foreclosure law.  But the foreclosure defense lawyer’s list omits 
bankruptcy, which contains some of the most potent mortgagor protection 
tools.  Bankruptcy would require foreclosure defense lawyers to move into 
a different legal system that, at least before the foreclosure crisis, may have 
been somewhat alien to them.72 
In the past, lawmakers have occasionally responded to general concerns 
about lack of comparative counseling by requiring that consumers receive 
 
 69. Sovern, Consumer Law Classes II, supra note 68, at 18.  
 70. Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 474, 608 (1985) (reporting that family law “represents as much as ninety 
percent of the work of private practitioners under judicare schemes, and even in staffed of-
fices it frequently is the single largest topic” and opining that “[t]his is neither surprising nor 
likely to change”); see also Kovac, supra note 22, at 749-50, 756 (noting the absence of le-
gal aid lawyers from debtor representation in her study of judgment proof filers in Tennes-
see). 
 71. Levine, supra note 7, at 698.  Levine is speaking of judicial foreclosures.  The speed 
of the process in nonjudicial foreclosure states can increase the difficulty for homeowners of 
getting any legal assistance. Immergluck et al., supra note 44, at 11-12. 
 72. Some bankruptcy lawyers are now concentrating on using bankruptcy as a forum to 
challenge mortgage holders’ rights against debtors’ homes. See, e.g., Robbie Whelan, Niche 
Lawyers Spawned Housing Fracas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010; Prashant Gopal, Foreclosure 
Lawyers Go to Max’s Farm for Edge, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Oct. 27, 2010).  And a former 
business bankruptcy lawyer has started a law practice that includes both consumer bank-
ruptcy and foreclosure defense. See LAKE LAW, http://www.lakelaw.com (last visited Mar. 
11, 2011). 
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basic written notice of their alternatives.73  But some scholars have doubted 
the utility of these requirements and instead have suggested that policy-
makers focus on educating and perhaps incentivizing the intermediaries, 
including but not limited to lawyers.74  Of course, this would require that 
lawmakers take a less antagonistic attitude toward those who represent and 
assist consumer debtors. 
CONCLUSION 
Studying the infrastructure of consumer debtor protections reminds us of 
an important fact: enhancing protection for individuals in lending and other 
commercial transactions is not merely a matter of increasing the number of 
substantive rights in statute books.75  Rather, the placement of rights, the 
bundling of rights, the complexity of the law, and the incentives shaping 
intermediaries’ activities all contribute to a determination of whether a le-
gal tool is a meaningful way to improve debtor-creditor law or just merely 
a hollow gesture. 
 
 73. 11 U.S.C. § 322 (2006) (providing that a lawyer will file a declaration or affidavit 
stating that she has informed the consumer of the relief available under both Chapters 7 and 
13).  Recent amendments conditioning bankruptcy eligibility on a credit counseling briefing 
can be understood as having a similar thrust. 
 74. Kovac, supra note 22, at 754 (“We believe that amending the Bankruptcy Code to 
add non-bankruptcy solutions to the options that must be explained to consumer debtors 
would probably not produce a significant reduction in the personal bankruptcy rate.”); Lan-
der, supra note 47, at 189 (recognizing the likelihood of proper sorting between bankruptcy 
and credit counseling depends on the availability of legal counsel that is both “competent 
and affordable”); Ramsay, supra note 59, at 419 (“Most trustees would indicate to consum-
ers their rights in relation to collection practices but only a minority seemed interested in 
actively providing a consumer with material on how to address harassment.”); Sullivan et 
al., supra note 61, at 858. 
 75. E.g., Macaulay, supra note 55; Sullivan et al., supra note 61; Whitford, Structuring 
Consumer Protection, supra note 2. 
